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The 2008–09 economic crisis has had a long-lasting 
negative impact on the Mexican economy. This paper 
examines labor market dynamics in Mexico in light 
of the crisis. The labor market has been characterized 
in recent years by low relative unemployment, but 
high levels of informal jobs, low-growth, and almost 
stagnant real wages. In this context, the crisis destroyed 
a wide number of formal jobs, and even informal, 
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increasing the unemployment rates to pre-crisis levels. 
Manufacturing was the sector that endured the largest 
job losses during the crisis and wages decreased for all 
sectors. The government of Mexico implemented a 
variety of programs to cope with the crises. However, 
these measures were too limited to counteract the large 
negative impact of the crisis on labor markets. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The economic crisis that hit worldwide during 2008-2009 produced a slowdown in economic activity 
and a significant reduction in the number and quality of jobs. Even though the severity of the crisis 
has differed by country or region, none has escaped its effects to some extent.  
 
How governments implemented effective policies to spur growth and reduce the negative effects of 
the  crisis  on  labor  markets  (for  example,  incorporating  most  of  the  laid  off  back  again  into 
employment) is worth analyzing to draw conclusions and policy lessons for the future. Countries like 
Germany or Brazil have been more successful than Spain or Mexico in containing the negative 
effects of the crisis on the labor market. This discrepancy deserves further analyses. 
 
The  labor  market  dynamics  of  Mexico  have  been  characterized  in  recent  years  by  low  relative 
unemployment, but high levels of informal jobs, and low-growth, almost stagnant, real wages. These 
dynamics have been affected by the crisis. Unemployment rates usually were around 3.5 percent and 
after the crisis increased to about a persistent 5.5 percent. The levels of informality, measured as 
access  to  social  security  benefits  through  an  employment  contract,  have  been  high.  In  1993, 
informality was around 63 percent of total employment and increased to about 66 percent recently. 
This acted as one of the main mechanisms to adjust the labor market. During the crisis, average real 
wages  declined  in  almost all  economic  activities  and no increase  has been recorded during the 
recovery. Real wages are lower compared to  pre-crisis levels. Whether unemployment rates will 
continue to be relatively high, as a new bottom, and informality can continue absorbing workers in 
the sector is a matter of interest for the implementation of public policies and regulation reforms 
aimed at reliving the lasting effects from the 2008-09 crisis.  
 
The aim of this paper is to describe in detail the effects of the crisis on the labor markets in Mexico 
and discuss the policies implemented by the government to cope with the crisis. In sour analysis, we 
identify the groups most affected and how policies adopted helped these groups weather the crisis. 
In addition, we compare public spending plans to fiscal mechanisms and other policies to drawn 
some conclusions about their effectiveness. 
 
2.  The Economic Crisis and Mexico’s Labor Market 
 
Real GDP growth in Mexico has been uneven over the last decade. Whereas in 2000 GDP grew at a 
rate of 6.6 percent, growth was only 3 percent in 2005, and 3.5 percent in 2007, just before the crisis. 
Growth  decomposition  studies  (Bergoeing  et  al.,  2002;  Faal,  2005)  show  that  moderate  output 
growth in Mexico is mainly due to accumulation of production factors rather than higher levels of 
productivity. The sharp decline in productivity growth during the 1980s is generally attributed to the 
impact of macroeconomic instability on economic activity and investment. Subsequent progress 
over the past decade in attaining macroeconomic stability and opening up the economy to trade and 
investment flows in the context of bilateral trade agreements has contributed to a steady though 3 
 
modest increase in productivity growth. Key factors cited in various studies to explain why Mexico 
has not grown as fast as other countries (see, for example, OECD, 2009) include relative weaknesses 
in education, infrastructure, financial development, and the rule of law, as well as anticompetitive 
and restrictive  regulation of  product  and  labor  markets  (Loayza and Palacios,  1997;  Rodríguez-
Oreggia, 2010).  
 
The Mexican economy was hard hit by the financial crisis and the increase in international food 
prices in 2008. The inflation rate has been on declining trajectory since the end of 2008 while the 
exchange  rate  has  experienced  a  slight  increase  (figure  2.1).  The  collapse  of  external  demand, 
particularly in durable consumer goods, in the last quarter of 2008 and the first half of 2009 led to an 
almost immediate and severe downturn in economic activity. The loss of employment and the high 
level  of  uncertainty  and  risk  brought  by  the  economic  crisis  contributed  to  a  fall  in  private 
consumption and investment, further reducing aggregate demand and inflationary pressure.  
 
Figure 2.1: Annual Inflation and Exchange Rate  
 
Source: Data from Central Bank of Mexico. 
 
A subsequent rebound in external demand as of the second half of 2009 gave rise to a recovery, 
even though private consumption and investment are trailing behind and have not yet contributed 
significantly to the upturn of economic activity. Figure 2.2 depicts levels of economic activity and 
the main components of aggregate demand, showing that by the second quarter of 2010 GDP was 
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investment, whereas the level of exports has returned to its pre-crisis level and public expenditure 
never dropped. Public expenditure, however, slightly increased  even during the economic crisis. 
Recovery mostly seems to have come from the export increase.  
 
Figure 2.2: GDP and Components of Aggregate Demand during the Crisis 
 
Source: World Bank (2010). 
 
The large contraction of economic activity by 6.5 percent in 2009 created a particularly large output 
gap. This could mean that the economy will grow for some years at a level moderately above its 
potential rate of growth; that is, absorbing excess capacity instead of creating inflationary pressures 
or  absorbing  new  employment.  In  2009,  the  government  opted  to  maintain  the  same  level  of 
expenditures as in the previous year despite large drops in public revenue. Then the government 
initiated a process of fiscal consolidation by increasing taxes and containing public expenditures. The 
increase in taxes and public sector prices may have led to consumer price inflation by the end of 
2010 compared to 2009. The government also opted to increase the level of international reserves to 
mitigate potential further financial shocks.  
 
During the crisis, the central bank intervened in foreign exchange markets by providing foreign 
currency liquidity to the private sector. The Mexican peso increased in the last quarter of 2008 and 
has remained steady since then. Monetary policy has taken place within a medium-term inflation 
targeting  framework  of 3  percent.  The  central  bank  eased  monetary policy in  January 2009.  In 
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Mexico. Inflation was under control, credit did not collapse, and no financial institution required 
intervention. In this regard, this crisis was very different from previous crises in the country, with 
effects  concentrating  in  this  case  on  the  real  side  of  the  economy  only  (that  is,  output  and 
employment). 
 
Total employment (figure 2.3, top panel) declined for the last three quarters of 2008 and the first of 
2009, after which there were several consecutive quarters of positive job creation. In the second 
quarter of 2008, just before the crisis started, total employment was about 43.9 million workers, 
declining to 42.9 million in the first quarter of 2009. Employment growth then resumed, reaching a 
peak in the fourth quarter of 2009 with 44.5 million workers. 
 
Despite significant job creation for most of 2009, total unemployment by the end of 2010 was 0.9 
million workers above pre-crisis levels (figure 2.3, bottom panel). This indicates an economic crisis 
that, on the one hand, produced a rapid decline and recovery in total employment but, on the other 
hand, has not been able to produce enough jobs during the recovery so that unemployment returns 
to pre-crisis levels. 
 
 

















































































































































































year-to-year GDP growth total employment6 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía—
INEGI), the Economic Data Bank (Banco de Informacion Economica—BIE), and the Mexican Occupation and Employment Survey 




By  March  2011  total  employment  had  recovered,  but  unemployment  and  informality  rates  still 
compared unfavorably with the situation during the worse of the crisis. Even though the Mexican 
labor market has shown signs of an irregular recovery during the last months, as of early 2011 it 
remained in worse condition than before the crisis. The unemployment rate, which reached the 
almost record high of 6.41 percent in September 2009, declined every month (with the exception of 
the seasonal peak of January) to 4.81 percent in March 2010 but then rose to above 5 percent for 
most of 2010 (see figure 2.4). It again rose above 5 percent in April 2011 and reached 5.2 in June 
2011. Thus, unemployment has hovered above 5 percent since October 2009, which is above the 
pre-crisis  level.  The  12-month  average  unemployment  rate  has  flattened  out  but  it  is  nearly  2 
percentage points above the average in early 2008. A significant reduction in unemployment is still 













































































































































































year-to-year GDP growth total unemployment7 
 
Figure 2.4: Monthly Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from INEGI, BIE. 
 
Informal employment also showed a slight increase during all quarters of year 2009, but declined 
quarter after quarter in 2010. All definitions of informal employment regularly used in studies for 
Mexican  labor  markets  show  an  upward  trend  during  2009  and  a  downward  trend  in  2010. 
Informality rates that measure lack of access to health or social security show an increase of nearly 2 
percentage points between the fourth quarters of 2009 and 2008. Informality rates that concentrate 
on self-employment or on informal home-firms also show an increase.
2 Preliminary numbers of the 
share of self-employed and family workers within total employment and the share of workers not 
affiliated to the social security also show an important dip in the fourth quarter of 2010 (see  figure 
2.5). 
 
                                                           
2 INEGI’s definition of informal employment is the percentage of employed workers who have a job in home-firms 
that have no accounting or fiscal registry. We use an alternative definition as well, measured as access to social 
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Figure 2.5: Informality Rates 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from INEGI, BIE, and ENOE, 4th quarter 2010. 
 
Analysis of job creation/destruction by economic activity also tells a story of how the crisis evolved. 
Figure 2.6 shows annual job creation/destruction for each sector of activity by quarter. Agriculture 
experienced three consecutive quarters of job destruction at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, 
and again shows destruction in the last two quarters of 2010. A similar pattern is observed for 
manufacturing: almost continuous destruction of jobs in 2008 and 2009, only recovering in 2010. 
The second quarter of 2009 shows the highest job decrease for manufacturing, a loss of about 
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Figure 2.6: Year-to-year Employment Changes by Economic Activity (in persons) 
   
   
   
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.f. Services10 
 
 
In the  construction sector,  job  destruction  lasted  longer than  in  agriculture  and manufacturing: 
losses were experienced from the third quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter in 2009. The worst 
quarter, the third in 2009, destroyed 216,000 jobs, whereas there was a recovery of about 35,000 jobs 
in the last two quarters of 2010. On the other hand, the trade and commerce sector had a briefer 
period of job destruction (only two quarters) although with meager wins afterwards. By the fourth 
quarter of 2010 trade and commerce again experienced a large decrease in jobs (these numbers, 
however, are preliminary and need revision).  
 
In contrast with all other sectors, services experienced job creation in every quarter. Even at the 
height of the crisis this sector was creating about 722,000 jobs. This indicates a crisis that severely 
affected economic activities associated with tradable products (that is, agriculture, manufacturing, 
and  tourism).  Construction,  even  though is  not  a  tradable goods  sector,  also  endured  a  severe 
contraction, which creates doubts about the efficacy of public works or investment in infrastructure 
as a response to crisis-led employment loses.  
 
The  dichotomy  in  job  creation/destruction  between  tradable  and  nontradable  sectors  can  also 
partially  be  seen  in  wages.  As  indicators  of  the  evolution  of  wages  we  chose  the  two  largest 
occupations in tradeables and nontradeables: blue collar workers in manufacturing and workers in 
retail commerce. Twelve-month average wages in retail commerce (the economic activity with the 
largest share of total employment in Mexico) had a large fall during the crisis and have stagnated at a 
level 10 percent lower in real terms than before the crisis (see figure 2.7, top-right panel). Twelve-
month average wages among blue-collar workers in manufacturing (where most of the Mexican 
exporting firms concentrate) have showed more resilience to the crisis with a much smaller decline 
of 1-2 percent with respect to the period before the crisis (see figure 2.7, top-left panel). A similar 
difference can be observed when comparing earnings indexes for construction and the nonfinance 
private services sector.
3 In this case, both sectors are  nontradeable. On the one hand, real average 
wages have remained stable in the construction industry over the whole period. On the other hand, 
an index of real incomes among  service sector workers fell significantly (around 8 percent) during 
first half of 2009 and then grew month after month to regain its pre-crisis level by late 2010 (see the 
bottom two charts of figure 2.7). These numbers reveal two types of labor market adjustment. Some 
sectors (like manufacturing and construction) adjusted to the crisis through a large job destruction 
but keeping real wages, whereas other sectors (like commerce and private nonfinancial services) saw 
a fall in wages together with sustained employment levels.  
 
                                                           
3 This sector includes transport and communications, real estate services, scientific and technical services, health 
services, education services, entertainment and sports services, and hotels and restaurants. 11 
 
Figure 2.7: Wage Indexes for Workers in Selected Industries 
   
   




The aggregate trends and average rates shown above are described in more detail for specific groups 









3.  Employment and Wages in Specific Groups during the Crisis 
 
In this section, we analyze changes in job creation/destruction and wages for specific groups. 
 
3.1. Job creation/destruction along the cycle  
 
Year-to-year net job creation  
 
We can characterize the evolution of the crisis by taking the second quarter of 2009 as the trough of 
the recession, and the second quarters of 2008 and 2010 as the beginning and the end of this cycle. 
Year-to-year net job flows through the second quarter of 2009 characterize the trough of the crisis, 
whereas  year-to-year  net  job  flows  from  the  second  quarter  of  2010  onward  characterize  the 
recovery. In addition, we include annual job flows in the second quarter of 2008  (before the crisis 
started) as a comparison to a noncrisis year Comparing annual performance by the second quarters 
avoids results being tainted by seasonal adjustments in the labor market. 
 
During the 2009 crisis, the labor supply in Mexico accelerated, making it more difficult to cope with 
the fall in labor demand. In fact, the population aged over 14 (also known as the potentially active 
population) increased by 1.73 million by the second quarter of 2009. This was over half a million 
more new workers than joined the labor force annually in previous years (for example, since 2003 
the average annual growth of the potentially active population has been around the 1.1 million). This 
massive influx of potential workers faced job destruction of a little more of 522,000 and nearly 
772,000 newly unemployed people. As a consequence, the inactive population grew by nearly 1.5 
million people, 1.1 million of which were available to work (see table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1: Annual Changes in Main Components of the Labor Force  










available  TOTAL  unemployed  employed 
2007  1,176,542  340,166  63,419  276,747  836,376  127,495  708,881 
2008  1,233,282  185,131  365,100  (179,969)  1,048,151  88,111  960,040 
2009  1,733,858  1,484,506  379,854  1,104,652  249,352  771,767  (522,415) 
2010  951,655  (476,747)  (209,674)  (267,073)  1,428,402  120,851  1,307,551 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain the origin of the acceleration in working age population but a likely suspect 
is a change in migration patterns. Two forces may have played a role: (i) the recession in the United 
States may have forestalled migration from Mexico to the United States, and (ii) for the same reason, 
Mexican migrants in the United States may have returned to their country of origin. Preliminary 
evidence suggests that even though the crisis more strongly affected Hispanics in the United States, 
there was no net change in migration. Workers in the United States did not return home in greater 
numbers, and workers from Mexico did not migrate to the United States in greater numbers (see, for 13 
 
example, Cornelius et  al.,  2010; Passel and Cohn,  2009).  On the  contrary,  there  is evidence  of 
declining migration flows from Mexico to the United States.
4 
 
By the second quarter of 2010, the recovery was strong enough to absorb all the growth in  the 
working-age population (which returned to a level comparable to  pre-crisis years) and part of the 
inactive from the previous year. In fact, during the following four quarters, nearly 1.5 million people 
entered the labor force and 1.3 million jobs were crea ted. Unemployment, however, continued 
growing, but at a rate similar to pre-crisis years. 
 
As seen in  table 3.1, 2009 and 2010 differ dramatically in their labor market performance. The 
former year shows large job destruction and expansion of unemployment whereas the latter includes 
massive job creation and a deceleration of joblessness. What are the characteristics of workers who 
constitute these substantial changes?  
 
The distribution of employment by personal characteristics is  shown in table 3.2. Interestingly, the 
distribution of job flows between males and females remained almost constant between 2009 and 
2010. Women represent around 45 percent of the job flows and, given  their smaller share in total 
employment, this implies that women  were proportionately more affected during the fall, but also 
more favored during the recovery.  
 
Regarding educational levels, there was a dual response to the crisis. Workers with primary education 
or less endured large job losses during the fall but few were employed during the recovery. Workers 
with secondary education (that is ,  at least nine years of schooling)  endured  relatively  little  job 
destruction in 2009 and were in the group with the largest job creation during 2010. Finally, workers 
with a high school education or better experienced similar job creation in both 2009 and 2010 
(around 480,000 new jobs). It appears that the crisis first shed workers with lower qualifications and 
then hired workers with intermediate  or better education. This result indicates an upgrading of the 
average schooling of new hires and that finding a job is becoming more difficult for people with low 
schooling. In contrast, the hiring of skilled workers does not seem to have been affected at all by the 
crisis.  
 
Severe changes in employment concentrated at the extremes of the age distribution. Those aged less 
than 45 had job losses in the fall and job gains in the recovery of around 800 ,000 workers. Those 
aged over 55 lost employment in 2009 but then had an important job sur ge in 2010. Middle-aged 
workers (46 to 55) comprise the only group that kept growing throughout the crisis.  
 
                                                           
4 Evidence collected from the National National Population Council (CONAPO) Encuestas sobre Migración en la 
Fronteras Norte y Sur de México (EMIF NORTE y EMIF SUR) and presented by the Mexican Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection during the Sixth World Bank IZA Conference on Employment and Development, Mexico City, June 
2, 2011.  14 
 
Finally,  there  is  an  important  geographic  distribution  of  job  flows.
5  The border region (which 
comprises Mexican states bordering the United States) experienced the largest job losses, followed 
by the center and capital regions. The latter two  contain  the largest share of total Mexican 
employment and population, which explains  both their large share of total employment losses and 
highlights the  greater impact of the crisis on  the less-populated border region. Employment has 
improved in a more than proportionate manner in all regions of the country except in the border  
region. This confirms the fact that the crisis had a severe impact on firms ass ociated with tradable 
goods, exports and manufacturing in particular, which  are concentrated at the U.S.-Mexican border 
and which have not picked up again despite the end of the crisis in both countries. The south Pacific 
and peninsula regions are the only regions that did not suffer job losses either in 2009 or in 2010. 
Decelerating job creation in the Yucatán Peninsula in 2009 hints at the reduction of tourism activity, 
associated both  with the American recession and the H1N1 virus outbreak of April 2009 . Both 
events led to a large number of cancellations.  
 
   
                                                           
5 The regions have been defined as follows. Capital: Mexico City, State of Mexico. Center: Morelos, Guanajuato, 
Hidalgo, Puebla, Querétaro, Tlaxcala. Central Gulf: Veracruz, Tabasco. Central North: Aguascalientes, Durango, 
San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas. Pacific North: Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, Nayarit. Pacific Center: Colima, Jalisco, 
Michoacán. Pacific South: Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca. Peninsula: Campeche, Yucatán, Quintana Roo. Border: Baja 
California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Sonora.  15 
 
Table 3.2: Decomposition of Annual Changes in Employment by Personal Characteristics 
   year ending the second quarter of… 
   2008  2009  2010 
TOTAL  960,040  -522,415  1,307,551 
  
      BY SEX 
      female  398,975  -221,542  603,825 
male  561,065  -300,873  703,726 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL 
      Without instruction  38,222  -290,129  18,351 
Primary  -117,628  -732,183  23,931 
Secondary  568,820  -87,614  661,404 
High school  323,360  296,169  409,459 
Professional  147,266  291,342  194,406 
BY AGE GROUP 
      Less than 26  171,178  -541,611  500,242 
From 26 to 35  109,625  -193,136  187,169 
From 36 to 45  319,282  -57,089  163,450 
From 46 to 55  165,732  285,681  148,266 
More than 55   194,223  -16,260  308,424 
BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
      Capital  248,065  -66,564  314,352 
Center region  69,142  -142,347  290,907 
Center gulf region  18,055  -32,695  126,057 
North central region  42,011  -30,037  65,428 
North pacific region  41,830  -17,509  54,851 
Central pacific region  159,689  -58,427  189,950 
South pacific region  24,861  59,082  95,370 
Peninsula region  74,524  9,541  59,828 
Border  281,863  -243,459  110,808 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
 
 
The crisis produced net job losses in the primary and secondary sectors (where tradable goods are 
produced)  and  a  much  subdued  job  creation  in  the  tertiary  sector  (shown  in  table  3.3). 
Manufacturing endured the largest employment destruction among all sectors, with 700,000 jobs 
lost. Construction activities experienced the second largest employment destruction (123,000 jobs 
lost), which indicates that public works were not able to create enough employment to at least partly 
compensate for the shock of the crisis. Interestingly, employment in restaurants and hotels also 
experienced job destruction of more than 45,000 (something not seen in the last ten years. This was 
perhaps due to the recession in developed countries and the outbreak in April 2010 of the H1N1 flu 
in Mexico, both of which must have reduced the number of tourists traveling to the country. 
 16 
 
The  recovery  has  produced  new  jobs  in  all  three  sectors.  Agriculture  jobs  grew  by  more  than 
250,000, something unusual in a sector that has experienced a secular decline in total employment 
for decades. This employment growth suggests a temporary return to agricultural activities as a 
subsistence strategy. Manufacturing also saw job creation but much less than the job losses of the 
previous year, so that employment is still below pre-crisis levels. The activities with the largest job 
growth were trade and commerce (364,400 jobs) and other services (260,000 jobs). This indicates 
that job creation has concentrated in activities with low entry barriers, where informal employment 
concentrates. 
 
Small and medium firms were responsible for the largest share of job creation during the recovery. 
In contrast, medium and large firms accounted for the largest share of the fall. This is compatible 
with the former description of a recession mostly affecting manufacturing firms and the recovery 
mostly favoring commerce and other services. It also depicts a crisis that destroyed employment in 
certain sectors of the economy that, four quarters later, have not returned to their pre-crisis levels. If 
we assume that tradable sectors and large firms have higher productivity and wages because of 
competitive pressures and larger capital endowment, then we can also assume that the recovery is 
not generating productive employment for the workers. 
 
   17 
 
Table 3.3: Decomposition of Annual Changes in Employment by Economic Activity and 
Position 
 
year ending the second quarter of… 
 
2008  2009  2010 
TOTAL  960,040  (522,415)  1,307,551 
 
 
    BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY   
    Primary  (30,714)  (77,160)  191,338 
Agriculture  (13,856)  (113,755)  254,482 
Mining and electricity  (16,858)  36,595  (63,144) 
Secondary  164,498  (795,552)  235,583 
Manufacturing  109,083  (672,193)  257,594 
Construction  55,415  (123,359)  (22,011) 
Tertiary  805,433  375,750  890,581 
Trade and commerce  101,366  12,870  364,390 
Restaurants and hotels  166,157  (45,601)  186,286 
Transport and communications  51,613  76,379  (46,833) 
Financial services  191,658  37,599  131,194 
Social services  46,923  168,234  18,605 
Other services  120,403  24,889  259,965 
Government services  127,313  101,380  (23,026) 
Not specified  20,823  (25,453)  (9,951) 
BY FIRM SIZE 
     
        Agriculture firms  (13,856)  (113,755)  254,482 
Micro firms  468,692  (221,427)  728,288 
Small firms  156,744  11,997  268,388 
Medium firms  4,337  (106,252)  (5,214) 
Large firms  55,688  (379,747)  (21,111) 
Government  127,313  101,380  (23,026) 
Other  11,072  (1,367)  121,036 
Not specified  150,050  186,756  (15,292) 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
 
Flows by employment characteristics accentuate the image of a severe recession affecting good jobs 
and a recovery concentrating in not-so-good employment creation (see table 3.4). Salaried formal 
jobs declined by 403,000 during the recession but only increased by 180,000 during the recovery. On 
the other hand, job positions characterized as salaried informal, self-employed, or nonpaid worker all 
increased by more than double the net flows observed the previous year. Furthermore, during the 
crisis the loss of jobs with health coverage was three times the loss of jobs without health coverage, 
and the latter grew more than six times the former during the recovery. Finally, crisis job losses 
concentrated among those with wages between two and five times the minimum wage in 2009 while 18 
 
recovery job gains concentrated among those earning less than twice the minimum wage in 2010. 
The number of workers earning more than five times the minimum wage declined in both 2009 and 
2010. 
 
Table 3.4: Decomposition of Annual Changes in Employment by Job Characteristics 
 
year ending the second quarter of… 
 
2008  2009  2010 
TOTAL  960,040  (522,415)  1,307,551 
        By position 
      Salaried (formal)  306,987  (403,852)  180,036 
Salaried (informal)  494,413  137,598  461,580 
Employer  7,129  (231,887)  180,802 
Self-employed  163,245  99,069  295,458 
Nonpaid worker  (11,734)  (123,343)  189,675 
By health insurance 
     
With health insurance 
303,141  (393,090)  166,798 
Without health insurance 
648,725  (123,084)  1,127,673 
No response  8,174  (6,241)  13,080 
By minimum wage 
category 
      Less than two  83,138  983,782  1,102,833 
Between two and five  569,144  (1,550,261)  596,770 
More than five  (33,439)  (486,374)  (701,495) 
No monetary income  (86,976)  (37,442)  148,427 
Undeclared  428,173  567,880  161,016 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
 
The discussion above describes employment flows during the crisis and the recovery. What are the 
characteristics of unemployment flows? Interestingly, in 2008, the year before the crisis, as many 
women as men lost their job or couldn’t find one. In 2009, however, the relation was four-to-one 
against men. More than 600,000 men became unemployed, while only 150,000 women did. During 
the recovery, the roles changed. A meager 7,000 men became unemployed while another 113,000 
women lost their jobs (see table 3.5). This indicates that the crisis hit men, but the recovery is 
relatively creating more female unemployment.  
 
Regarding  levels  of  education,  nearly  half  of  the  new  unemployed  during  the  recession  had 
completed secondary education but not high school (which in Mexico represents between 9 and 12 
years of education). This group is not the usual target of payroll cutbacks or job-searchers. The 
figures  indicate,  as  usual  but  with  larger  magnitudes,  that  unemployment  concentrates  among 19 
 
individuals with more education. Professionals did indeed take a serious blow in 2009 and 2010. 
Furthermore, job losses were mostly among younger workers, both in 2009 and 2010.  
 
Finally, changes in unemployment by location show a similar pattern to changes in employment. The 
largest unemployment changes occurred in the border, capital, and central regions. As explained 
before, the latter two concentrate the largest share of total Mexican population, which explains both 
their  large  share  of  total  unemployment  and  the  greater  impact  of  unemployment  in  the  less-
populated border region. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Decomposition of Annual Changes in Unemployment by Personal Characteristics 
   year ending the second quarter of… 
   2008  2009  2010 
TOTAL  88,111  771,767  120,851 
  
      BY SEX 
      Female  46,341  152,988  113,699 
Male  41,770  618,779  7,152 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL 
      Without instruction  11,743  21,522  -5,593 
Primary  26,805  187,998  22,458 
Secondary  30,827  313,027  32,773 
High school  39,754  171,422  27,342 
Professional  -21,018  77,798  43,871 
BY AGE GROUP 
      Less than 26  31,778  284,352  9,549 
From 26 to 35  8,148  180,417  66,278 
From 36 to 45  22,443  129,941  40,089 
From 46 to 55  15,395  118,860  1,750 
More than 55   10,347  58,197  3,185 
BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
      Capital  -37,911  240,194  5,394 
Center region  23,423  114,121  24,558 
Center gulf region  -1,310  34,349  20,172 
North central region  14,242  30,074  7,641 
North pacific region  -1,385  25,571  12,240 
Central pacific region  29,402  79,003  19,278 
South pacific region  -4,104  1,648  16,611 
Peninsula region  5,261  25,126  6,919 
Border  60,493  221,681  8,038 




Transition matrices from panel data 
 
Previous figures describe net job flows of employment and unemployment. However, these net 
flows only give a partial description of the workings of the labor market. Net job flows can be 
decomposed into four components, as follows: 
 
                                        
 
that is, the change in total employment between final (    ) and initial period (    ) equals the growth 
of employment due to transitions from inactivity (and from out of the labor force) (       ) and 
from unemployment (       ), minus those who lost employment and became inactive (       ) 
or unemployed (      ). Similar decompositions can be done for net flows in unemployment: 
 
                                        
 
and in inactivity 
                                        
 
These components can be observed in the cells of a transition matrix:  
 
  Inactive f  Unemployed f  Employed f 
Inactive i  -         =              =       
Unemployed i        =         -        =       
Employed i        =              =        - 
 
This transition matrix provides more nuanced information about job flows and reveals how changes 
in employment status are the consequence of gross flows to and from unemployment and inactivity. 
These  flows  also indicate  the likelihood of moving from one  status  to another.  The  Mexican 
Occupation  and  Employment  Survey  (Encuesta  Nacional  de  Ocupación  y  Empleo—ENOE)  has  a 
rotating panel that interviews the same household for five consecutive quarters. This implies that we 
can observe the same household and their individuals, and therefore its employment dynamics, for 21 
 
the second quarter of two consecutive years. With these observations, transition matrices can be 
produced. The following analysis makes use of these rotating panels for our periods of study.
6  
The first transition matrix we analyze is an estimation of gross job flows before the recession—that 
is, between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2008. In this case, we observe that 
around 9 million people became employed and 8.1 previously employed people became unemployed 
or inactive, thus a net job creation of around 0.9 million people was produced during the year before 
the recession. On the other hand, unemployment grew in only around 90 thousand people because 
around 1.5 million people previously employed or inactive became unemployed while nearly 1.4 
million previously unemployed either found a job or left the labor market.  
 
Table 3.6a: Transition Matrices for the Recession Period 
 
Second quarter 2008 
Inactive   Employed  Unemployed  Total  
Second quarter 2007 
Inactive or out  23,687,896     8,199,919     684,809     32,572,624    
Employed  7,385,503     34,766,246     754,907     42,906,656    
Unemployed  451,074     900,531     153,591     1,505,196    
Total  31,524,473     43,866,696     1,593,307     76,984,476    
Source: Own estimates using rotating panels from ENOE. 
 
The second transition matrix refers to the recession—that is, between the second quarter of 2008 
and the second quarter of 2009.  According to this estimate, the fall in total employment was mostly 
due to the difference between to a gross job destruction (workers who were employed and became 
unemployed) of 1.2 million workers and a gross job creation (workers who were unemployed and 
became employed) of 0.833 million (see table 3.6b). The gross flows towards and from inactivity 
nearly cancel out (both around 8 million people) so most of the job destruction in 2009 can be 
attributed  to  firing  existing  workers  in  a  proportion  that  more  than  compensated  new  hirings. 
Changes in unemployment can be attributed to the flows between employment and unemployment, 
already described, and to an additional flow from the inactive population. More than 951,000 initially 
inactive people became unemployed while only 544,000 formerly unemployed became inactive. This 
added 400,000 people (about half the total change) to the unemployed during the recession. In other 
words, the increase in unemployment is associated to the growth of labor supply.  
   
                                                           




Table 3.6b: Transition Matrices for the Recession Period 
 
Second quarter 2009 
Inactive   Employed  Unemployed  Total 
Second quarter 2008 
Inactive or out  24,484,780  7,822,462  951,089  33,258,331 
Employed  7,980,215  34,688,008  1,198,473  43,866,696 
Unemployed  543,984  833,811  215,513  1,593,308 
Total  33,008,979  43,344,281  2,365,075  78,718,335 
Source: Own estimates using rotating panels from ENOE. 
 
During the recovery (table 3.6c), the pattern of gross flows changed in the sense that there was an 
increase in employed workers, a reduction in inactive workers, but also an increase in unemployed 
workers. The flow from inactive to employed was reduced by 1 million compared with the previous 
year, and the flow from inactive to unemployed was about the same figure. Unemployment under 
such condition in both periods increased, as well as those moving from unemployed to employed. 
Those employed in both periods also increased, while flows from employed to inactive decreased, 
and flows to unemployed remained about same as the previous year. 
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Table 3.6c: Transition Matrices for the Recovery Period 
 
Second quarter 2010 
Inactive   Employed  Unemployed  Total 
Second quarter 2009 
Inactive or 
out  26,533,723  6,482,882  944,029  33,960,634 
Employed  5,423,962  36,760,882  1,159,437  43,344,281 
Unemployed  574,547  1,408,068  382,459  2,365,074 
Total  32,532,232  44,651,832  2,485,925  79,669,989 
Source: Own estimates using rotating panels from ENOE. 
 
Therefore, even though the recovery seems to be creating more jobs, there is also more persistence 
in the recovery period in the three categories: that is, more people remain as inactive, employed, or 
unemployed.  
 
An econometric analysis of transition probabilities  
 
The previous section described probabilities of transition from one employment status to another. 
However, these probabilities do not indicate the effect that a particular characteristic, such as age or 
education, has upon the likelihood of moving from one status to another. The effect of a single 
characteristic  upon  employment  transitions  is  known  as  conditional  probability.  It  is  called  so 
because it defines the effect of having one characteristic instead of another (for example, being a 
woman) upon a particular employment transition (for example, finding a job), under the condition 
that  all  the  other  characteristics  (age,  education,  and  so  forth)  remain  the  same.  Conditional 
probabilities are of analytical interest because they indicate whether certain traits involve propensities 
to lose or gain employment. This kind of probability is computed through an econometric technique 
using the same panel data described in the previous section.
7 
 
Estimates for the conditional probabilities of becoming jobless before, during the recession and the 
recovery are shown in table 3.7. The table shows evidence about five main messages. First, males 
always had a lower probability of losing a job , rather than keeping a job,  than females, but this 
advantage became larger during the recovery. Males were 2.9 percent less likely to become jobless, 
rather than keeping a job,  than observationally equivalent females during the recovery,  compared 
with 1.3 percent during the recession or 1.55 before the recession.  
 
                                                           
7 The conditional probabilities presented in this section were estimated through a multinomial logit model. The 
model estimated the transition probabilities of four possible states between two periods: staying in a job, staying 
jobless, finding a job, and losing a job. The base category is keeping a job; thus all the interpretations have to be 
made with respect to this category. The estimation made use of rotating panels from ENOE for the second quarters 
of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, for individuals aged 18 to 65. Further details about the estimation procedures are 
available from the authors upon request. 24 
 
Table 3.7: Marginal Propensities to Lose a Job 
   on the 2nd quarter 
Variables  2007-2008  2008-2009  2009-2010 
By sex 
   




-0.0155  ***  -0.0133  ***  -0.0298  *** 
(0.0039)     (0.0041)     (0.0035)    
By schooling level 






-0.0107  **  -0.0014     -0.0125  *** 
(0.0045)     (0.0049)     (0.0040)    
High School 
-0.0154  ***  -0.0118  **  -0.0113  *** 
(0.0047)     (0.0050)     (0.0042)    
Professional 
-0.0389  ***  -0.0298  ***  -0.0296  *** 
(0.0050)     (0.0056)     (0.0045)    
By region 






0.0039     0.0014     -0.0015    
(0.0078)     (0.0078)     (0.0067)    
Central gulf region 
0.0049     -0.0242  ***  0.0010    
(0.0099)     (0.0091)     (0.0086)    
North central region 
-0.0003     -0.0230  ***  -0.0164  ** 
(0.0083)     (0.0078)     (0.0067)    
North pacific region 
0.0067     -0.0027     -0.0167  ** 
(0.0094)     (0.0091)     (0.0071)    
Central pacific region 
0.0050     -0.0120     -0.0075    
(0.0081)     (0.0078)     (0.0067)    
South pacific region 
-0.0232  **  -0.0223  **  -0.0190  ** 
(0.0108)     (0.0110)     (0.0092)    
Peninsular region 
-0.0163  *  -0.0216  ***  -0.0180  ** 
(0.0085)     (0.0084)     (0.0071)    
Border 
0.0015     -0.0036     -0.0094    
(0.0079)     (0.0078)     (0.0065)    
By age 





From 26 to 35 years 
-0.0392  ***  -0.0197  ***  -0.0222  *** 
(0.0046)     (0.0052)     (0.0044)    
From 36 to 45 year 
-0.0421  ***  -0.0329  ***  -0.0255  *** 
(0.0048)     (0.0053)     (0.0045)    
From 46 to 55 years 
-0.0360  ***  -0.0271  ***  -0.0078    
(0.0054)     (0.0059)     (0.0053)    
From 56 to 65 years 
-0.0116  *  0.0148  *  0.0209  *** 
(0.0068)     (0.0079)     (0.0071)    






-0.0318  ***  -0.0410  ***  -0.0256  *** 
(0.0044)     (0.0045)     (0.0040)    
Pseudo R2  0.1395  0.1302  0.134 
N  42915  42170  40336 
Source: Own calculations using rotating panel from ENOE between 2nd quarters of 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
Note:  
a. Level of instruction is compared to "No level of instruction and primary." 25 
 
b. Geographic regions are compared to "Capital." 
c. Age is compared with "From 18 to 25." 
Omitted control groups are (1) with primary or less schooling; (2) Capital region; (3) Less of 26 years of age. Marginal 
effects on transition probabilities from employment to joblessness computed on the average using STATA command. 
Marginal effects are compared with the probability to be employed in both periods. 
 
Second, individuals with higher education were less likely to lose a job, compared to keeping a job, 
both  during  the  recession  and  the  recovery.  The  difference  is  among  workers  with  secondary 
education (semi-skilled), who were as likely to lose a job, rather than keeping a job, as those with 
primary  or  less  schooling  during  the  recession.  Thus,  the  group  of  semi-skilled  workers  was 
particularly affected by the crisis (as mentioned in the discussion of table 3.2). Third, workers from 
the Yucatán Peninsula, the south Pacific, and the north central regions were less likely to become 
jobless (around 2 percent less), rather than keeping a job, than workers from the capital region. This 
advantage  was  observed  before  the  crisis  and  persisted  during  the  recovery,  although  it  was 
somewhat smaller. On the other hand, the north central region was the most affected by the crisis. 
Fourth, middle-aged workers were less likely to become jobless, instead of keeping their jobs, than 
young and senior workers. This pattern was observed both in the recession and the recovery, but the 
disadvantage of senior workers (those aged more than 55) became even worse during the recovery 
when they became more likely to lose a job (around 2 percent more than the youngest group). 
Finally,  household  heads  were  less  likely  to  lose  a  job,  rather  than  staying  in  one,  than  other 
household members, but this advantage was smaller during the recovery (2.6 percent less likely) than 
during the recession (4.1 percent less likely). 
 
Estimates for the conditional probabilities of finding a job, instead of staying in one, before and 
during the recession and the recovery are shown in table 3.8. Here we also have five main messages. 
First, males always had a lower probability of finding a job than females, rather than staying in one, 
and this probability has not changed significantly over time. Males were 3.6 percent less likely to 
become employed, rather than staying in a job, than observationally equivalent females, both during 
the recession and the recovery (slightly less likely, 4.2 percent, before the crisis). Second, individuals 
with higher schooling were less likely to find a job, instead of keeping a job, but such advantage was 
diminished during and after the recession. Workers with professional education were 3.5 percent less 
likely to find a job, compared with their probability of staying in a job in both periods, during the 
recession than similar workers with only primary or less education. This magnitude climbed to 5.0 
percent during the recovery. Third, workers with similar characteristics but from different regions 
faced the same probability of finding a job rather than staying in a job, both during the recession and 
the recovery, with the exception of workers from the Yucatán Peninsula: they were less likely to find 
a job (a slight 1.4 percent) during the recession compared with a similar likelihood of keeping a job. 
Fourth, middle-aged workers were less likely to quit jobs, instead of staying in a job, than young and 
senior  workers.  This  pattern  was  observed  both  in  the  recession  and  the  recovery,  but  such 
difference was narrower during the recession. Finally, household heads were less likely to find a job, 
instead of keeping one, than other household members, but this was larger during the recession (4.5 
percent less likely) than during the recovery (3.3 percent less likely) or before the crisis (3.2 percent). 26 
 
 
Table 3.8: Marginal Propensities to Find a Job  
   on the 2nd quarter 









-0.0420  ***  -0.0366  ***  -0.0359  *** 
(0.0031)     (0.0031)     (0.0034)    









-0.0108  ***  -0.0087  **  -0.0083  ** 
(0.0036)     (0.0036)     (0.0039)    
High School 
-0.0151  ***  -0.0115  ***  -0.0255  *** 
(0.0036)     (0.0036)     (0.0039)    
Professional 
-0.0401  ***  -0.0351  ***  -0.0504  *** 










-0.0027     0.0095     0.0080    
(0.0061)     (0.0064)     (0.0073)    
Central gulf region 
-0.0151  **  -0.0008     -0.0036    
(0.0070)     (0.0078)     (0.0088)    
North central region 
-0.0039     0.0055     0.0118    
(0.0065)     (0.0069)     (0.0081)    
North pacific region 
-0.0051     -0.0050     0.0116    
(0.0071)     (0.0070)     (0.0087)    
Central pacific region 
-0.0049     0.0030     0.0073    
(0.0062)     (0.0064)     (0.0075)    
South pacific region 
-0.0052     -0.0058     -0.0055    
(0.0091)     (0.0090)     (0.0104)    
Peninsular region 
-0.0052     -0.0141  **  -0.0045    
(0.0070)     (0.0064)     (0.0080)    
Border 
0.0021     -0.0066     -0.0002    









From 26 to 35 years 
-0.0401  ***  -0.0318  ***  -0.0443  *** 
(0.0033)     (0.0033)     (0.0036)    
From 36 to 45 year 
-0.0534  ***  -0.0365  ***  -0.0550  *** 
(0.0033)     (0.0034)     (0.0036)    
From 46 to 55 years 
-0.0397  ***  -0.0328  ***  -0.0482  *** 
(0.0037)     (0.0038)     (0.0040)    
From 56 to 65 years 
-0.0237  ***  -0.0195  ***  -0.0285  *** 
(0.0048)     (0.0049)     (0.0050)    








-0.0418  ***  -0.0425  ***  -0.0373  *** 
(0.0036)     (0.0035)     (0.0039)    
Pseudo R2  0.1395  0.1302  0.134 
N  42915  42170  40336 27 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using rotating panel from ENOE between 2nd quarters of 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
Note:  
a. Level of instruction is compared to "No level of instruction and primary." 
b. Geographic regions are compared to "Capital." 
c. Age is compared with "From 18 to 25." 
Omitted control groups are (1) with primary or less schooling; (2) Capital region; (3) Less of 26 years of age. Marginal 
effects on transition probabilities from employment to joblessness computed on the average using STATA. 
 
In summary, these results indicate that there were only small differences in how the recession and 
the recovery affected different groups. By a small margin, those more likely to stay in a job during 
the economic crisis were the males, high skilled, household heads, and middle-aged workers.  
 
 
3.2. Wage growth along the cycle 
 
Average wages in real terms have declined for all groups. According to personal characteristics there 
seems to be a general decrease in wages (table 3.9). Males experienced higher decreases than females, 
up to 5.3 percent compared to 4.9 percent. By educational level, higher wage loses are concentrated 
in both tails, those with no instruction and those with higher instruction. Middle-skilled workers also 
experienced wage loses, although comparatively smaller. All age groups experienced wage loses, 
especially those in the middle groups of 36-45 and 46-55. Considering geographic location, wage 
loses at the beginning of the crisis were concentrated in the capital and central states. At the end of 
the  period  of  analysis  losses  were  higher  in  states  bordering  the  United  States  with  high 
manufacturing employment, the Yucatán Peninsula with high tourism employment, and the north 
central states. 
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Table 3.9: Change in Real Wages by Group 
 
year ending the second quarter of… 
 
year ending the second quarter 
of… 
   2007  2008  2009  2010 
 
2008  2009  2010 
  
Hourly wage by characteristics (pesos 
2010) 
 
inter annual percentage 
changes 
BY SEX 
                Female  34.8  34.5  33.4  32.1 
 
-1.1  -3.0  -3.9 
Male  37.1  36.0  34.7  32.9 
 
-2.9  -3.6  -5.3 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL 
                Without instruction  20.6  20.0  20.5  19.3 
 
-3.2  2.6  -5.5 
Primary  25.7  25.5  24.8  23.6 
 
-1.0  -2.5  -4.8 
Secondary  29.0  28.1  27.3  26.0 
 
-3.1  -3.1  -4.5 
High school  39.4  38.7  37.2  35.0 
 
-1.6  -3.8  -6.0 
Professional  69.2  66.3  64.5  60.8 
 
-4.2  -2.7  -5.7 
BY AGE GROUP 
                Less than 26  25.4  25.3  24.9  24.5 
 
-0.4  -1.6  -1.7 
From 26 to 35  35.2  34.3  33.6  32.2 
 
-2.5  -2.2  -4.1 
From 36 to 45  40.0  39.4  37.5  35.0 
 
-1.6  -4.8  -6.5 
From 46 to 55  42.9  41.3  39.3  37.2 
 
-3.7  -4.9  -5.3 
More than 55   36.9  35.5  34.7  33.9 
 
-3.8  -2.0  -2.4 
BY GEOGRAPHIC 
LOCATION 
                Capital  36.4  33.3  33.3  32.8 
 
-8.4  0.1  -1.7 
Center region  33.1  31.1  30.4  29.2 
 
-6.1  -2.3  -3.7 
Center gulf region  35.0  34.5  33.6  32.5 
 
-1.3  -2.6  -3.3 
North central region  33.8  33.6  31.6  29.9 
 
-0.4  -6.1  -5.3 
North pacific region  42.9  42.7  41.6  40.1 
 
-0.4  -2.5  -3.7 
Central pacific region  35.2  34.8  33.3  32.4 
 
-1.2  -4.4  -2.6 
South pacific region  28.9  28.2  26.4  26.5 
 
-2.5  -6.3  0.3 
Peninsula region  35.4  34.3  33.2  31.4 
 
-3.1  -3.2  -5.5 
Border  40.4  40.4  39.0  35.6 
 
-0.1  -3.4  -8.7 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
 
 
The  distribution  of  wage  changes  by  economic  activity  show  some  interesting  patters.  In  2009 
average  wages  fell  in  all  sectors  but  two:  manufacturing  and  government  services.  Note  that 
manufacturing was also the sector that endured the largest job losses, showing a clear pattern of 
adjustment to the crisis through quantities rather than prices. The case of government services is 
perhaps  due  to  the  fact  that  wages  in  the  public  sector  are  less  sensitive  to  economic  crisis, 
particularly if the crisis does not have budgetary implications such as fiscal consolidation. 
 29 
 
Real wages declined in all activities of the tertiary sector. These decreases range from a slight -0.1 
percent in social services and -1.2 percent in financial sector to severe -9.7 percent in restaurants and 
hotels and -5.1 percent in trade in commerce. The latter has been one of the few sectors that had no 
job  destruction  over  the  crisis,  indicating  a  process  of  adjustment  through  wages  rather  than 
quantities. Sectors like agriculture, construction, and restaurant/hotels endured both a reduction of 







Figure 3.1: Price and Quantities Adjustment by Economic Activity over the Crisis 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
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In  2010,  during  the  recovery,  real  wages  continued  falling.  In  some  cases  like  manufacturing, 
transport, and communications, wage reductions were harsh. This is consistent with the evidence 
from  the  previous  section  that  indicates  that  the  creation  of  new  jobs  during  the  recovery 
concentrated in workers in the lower end of the wage distribution (see table 3.4). This continued fall 
in real wages confirms that the initial stages of the recovery brought new jobs but with lower average 
wages.  
 
Real wages declined for all types of firms during the recession, except large firms and government 
employees. On the other hand, all types of firms recorded a decline in real wages during the recovery 
(see table 3.10). We can also show wages according to access to social security benefits and type of 
job. According to table 3.11, where wages by sector were indexed to 2007=100, workers in public 
administration lost only about 3 percent of real wages, while those in the Mexican Institute of Social 
Security (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social—IMSS) lost about 9 percent, in the oil company Petroles 
Mexicanos (PEMEX) about 13 percent, and those not affiliated lost between 6-10 percent of real 
wages during the crisis. 
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Table 3.10: Change in Real Wages by Group  
   year ending the second quarter of 
 
year ending the second quarter 
of 
   2007  2008  2009  2010 
 
2008  2009  2010 
BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Hourly wage by sector (pesos 
2010) 
 
inter annual percentage changes 
Primary 
                Agriculture  20.5  20.1  19.6  19.3 
 
-1.9%  -2.6%  -1.5% 
Mining and electricity  55.1  52.9  50.1  50.5 
 
-4.0%  -5.4%  0.9% 
Secondary 
                Manufacturing  31.0  29.3  29.4  27.3 
 
-5.6%  0.5%  -7.1% 
Construction  34.5  34.1  33.1  32.1 
 
-1.3%  -2.7%  -3.2% 
Tertiary 
                Trade and commerce  30.5  29.6  28.1  27.1 
 
-3.2%  -5.1%  -3.4% 
Restaurants and hotels  28.8  29.2  26.4  25.5 
 
1.6%  -9.7%  -3.5% 
Transport and 
communications  36.4  34.7  33.5  30.2 
 
-4.4%  -3.6%  -9.9% 
Financial services  46.7  43.5  42.8  40.9 
 
-7.0%  -1.4%  -4.6% 
Social services  61.9  61.0  61.0  56.8 
 
-1.4%  -0.1%  -6.9% 
Other services  31.9  32.5  30.8  29.6 
 
1.9%  -5.3%  -3.7% 
Government services  45.9  45.2  45.3  42.9 
 
-1.5%  0.2%  -5.1% 
Not specified  27.0  28.2  25.3  27.3 
 
4.4%  -10.2%  8.1% 
BY FIRM SIZE 
                Agriculture firms   20.5  20.1  19.6  19.3 
 
-1.9%  -2.6%  -1.5% 
Micro firms  33.1  32.4  31.4  30.0 
 
-2.2%  -3.3%  -4.4% 
Small firms  42.9  42.4  40.1  38.4 
 
-1.2%  -5.4%  -4.2% 
Medium firms  37.8  36.6  36.2  34.2 
 
-3.1%  -1.1%  -5.3% 
Large firms  45.7  44.0  44.3  41.1 
 
-3.8%  0.7%  -7.1% 
Government  45.9  45.2  45.3  42.9 
 
-1.5%  0.2%  -5.1% 
Other  22.6  23.0  22.4  22.4 
 
1.8%  -3.0%  0.0% 
Not specified  30.2  29.7  29.5  28.1 
 
-1.7%  -0.7%  -4.7% 
Self employed  33.2  33.1  32.4  31.1 
 
-0.2%  -2.1%  -4.2% 
Owner  64.1  60.2  55.0  53.9 
 
-6.1%  -8.6%  -2.0% 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
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Table 3.11: Index of Real Wages per Hour by Affiliation to Social Security (2007=100) 
 
2007  2008  2009  2010 
IMSS/Salaried  100  98  94  91 
ISSSTE/Salaried  100  99  97  97 
PEMEX—Defense/Salaried  100  94  89  87 
Not affiliated—employer/Self employed  100  98  92  90 
Not affiliated/Salaried  100  99  96  94 
Source: Own calculations using data from ENOE. 
 
All this evidence reveals the asymmetry of adjustment over the course of the crisis. During the 
recession, some sectors reduced employment quantities only, others adjusted real wages only, and 
others adjusted the two margins. During the recovery, all sectors (with the exception of mining) 
have showed job creation with lower real wages (see figure 3.1). The crisis produced a significant 
dislocation of the Mexican labor market. There were large flows of job destruction and creation that 
left the country with employment levels similar to before the crisis, but unemployment levels of 
around 900,000 people more than before the crisis. Average wages declined for all sectors  
 
 
4.  Policies to Cope with the Crisis  
 
The Mexican government announced a series of programs to cope with the crisis, which included 
the Program to encourage Growth and Employment (PICE) announced in October 2008, and the 
National Agreement to support the Household Economy and Employment (Ampliación del Programa 
de Empleo Temporal a Nivel Federal—ANFEFE), announced in January 2009. The expected outcome 
was  a  about  a  0.9  percent  boost  of  GDP.  Additional  support  in  the  form  of  credit  from 
development banks was expected to increase total investment to about 171,000 million pesos, or 
about 1.4 percent of GDP (CEFP, 2009). 
PICE aimed to cope with the effects of the economic crisis by using resources mainly from oil 
revenues.  A  total  of  255,000  million  pesos  was  to  be  used  in  infrastructure,  massive  transport 
programs, and other priority sectors. These goals were reinforced in January 2009 with a presidential 
agreement  creating  the  Intersecretarial  Commission  for  Acquisitions  and  Works  in  the  Public 
Administration  for  the  Small,  Micro  and  Medium  Firms.  The  commission  aimed  to  ease  crisis 
conditions by at least a 20 percent increase in public sector acquisitions from those firms. 
The main mechanism of PICE was public expenditure in infrastructure, with an initial budget of 
about 0.7 percent of the GDP (excluding investment in oil sector) of about 90,000 million pesos. 
The National Fund for Infrastructure is part of PICE which is the flagship infrastructure program of 
the administration. Another 90,200 million pesos was awarded to PEMEX to build a new refinery 
and other infrastructure. Despite a lack of information about the execution of those programs, a 
report of the House of Deputies (CEFP, 2009) stated that at as of mid-2009, there had been very 
little progress. For example, by the first quarter of 2009 only 15 percent of the infrastructure fund 34 
 
had been spent on road infrastructure and only 0.4 percent on other infrastructure such as water 
provision, sewage, and water purification. The CEFP report states that the main problem is the 
allocation of resources to projects without any execution plan or rights to build. About 40 percent of 
the  programs  were  still  undefined  in  2009,  and  other  50  percent  were  delayed  because  of 
cumbersome bureaucratic processes. 
Although  public  expenditure  increased  at  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  (see  figure  2.2),  private 
investment has lagged. Furthermore, recovery has not been led by growth in public investment, 
which is still below pre-crisis levels. Given the limited information available about public works 
programs, and that this limited information indicates that very modest progress was attained during 
the first year of the crisis, when it was most needed, we will concentrate on the labor policies 
adopted by the Mexican government. 
 
4.1. Labor Policies  
 
On January 2009, the federal government announced ANFEFE, a series of policy actions and a 
string of commitments on the part of several public and private Mexican institutions. These included 
allocation of 750 million pesos to foster changing home appliances and a reduction in natural gas 
prices as well as gasoline. ANFEFE policy actions can be grouped into different pillars. The first 
pillar, Support to Employment (Apoyo al Empleo y a los Trabajadores), is a combination of both active 
and passive labor market policies to confront the international crisis. 
 
The Temporary Employment Program (Programa de Empleo Temporal—PET) and the National System 
of Employment (Servicio Nacional de Empleo—SNE) were the two main active labor market polices 
proposed in the ANFEFE. SNE is an emergency temporary employment program for unemployed 
or reduced-income workers, and includes labor intermediation, mobility, and training services. In 
January 2009 it was announced that the fund would pay out 2.2 million pesos by the end of 2009. 
 
Research shows that employment programs are considered to be an appropriate mechanism for 
dealing with cyclical downturns in the labor market. They provide income support for those who 
have lost their jobs and, given their self-targeting mechanism (they usually pay below minimum or 
nearly  minimum  wages),  they  focus  on  people  most  in  need  of  finding  an  income  source.  In 
addition, since they are not tied to social security contributions or any other previous employment 
requirement, temporary employment programs are expected to benefit those in the bottom of the 
income distribution. The international impact evaluation literature finds that these programs have 
only short-term employment impacts and no wage/productivity impact for the beneficiaries. The 
Latin American literature for this type of program finds positive short-term employment effects. 
This evidence confirms the anti-cyclical, temporary, emergency character of the program. 
 















Women  Men  Total  Total  Total  Total 
    2001  52,117  496,586  1,315,999  1,812,585  $4,189,653,967.66   $450,019,780.18   $4,639,673,747.84  
    2002  51,021  543,243  1,278,419  1,821,662  $4,242,774,631.04   $245,796,508.44   $4,488,571,139.48   -3.26  0.50 
2003  25,311  250,180  567,315  817,495  $2,255,278,382.08   $138,524,438.50   $2,393,802,820.58   -46.67  -55.12 
2004  21,113  202,856  472,362  675,218  $2,109,057,492.07   $105,885,426.28   $2,214,942,918.22   -7.47  -17.40 
2005  19,944  216,825  455,613  672,438  $1,877,185,023.02   $94,377,560.32   $1,971,562,583.33   -10.99  -0.41 
2006  12,179  125,229  255,381  380,610  $1,281,311,186.55   $83,278,255.43   $1,364,589,441.99   -30.79  -43.40 
2007  15,703  158,032  319,639  477,671  $1,618,325,026.11   $118,873,516.82   $1,737,198,542.93   27.31  25.50 
2008  10,885  180,993  204,031  385,024  $937,778,360.49   $115,867,574.70   $1,053,645,935.20   -39.35  -19.40 
2009  29,694  279,838  402,989  682,827  $2,367,102,898.59   $118,748,488.50   $2,485,851,387.09   135.93  77.35 
2010  26,712  427,985  469,722  897,707  $2,756,077,660.77   $110,812,687.92   $2,866,890,348.70   15.33  31.47 
Source: data from the Information Center for the Program of Temporal Employment (CIPET). 
 
The table displays the number of implemented works related to hiring workers, the beneficiaries, 
and the federal and state budgets. The number of beneficiaries increased by 136 percent from 2008 
to 2009, and by another 15 percent through 2010, while the budget increased by 77 percent from 
2008 to 2009 and by another 31 percent through 2010. Most of the increase in the budget came 
from federal sources. PET’s response to the crisis peaked in January 2009, and the 2008 figures for 
beneficiaries and the budget show a reduction from 2007. Furthermore, despite the sharp increase in 
unemployment during the crisis, the total budget in 2010 is only about 60 percent of the resources 
allocated in 2001, which was a year with more stability, and the number of beneficiaries is lagging by 
a million (also compared with 2001). 
 
 
Important elements of the PET include extension to urban areas in response to job destruction in 
manufacturing and services, and support for the unemployed. The ability of PETS to reach urban 
areas and the unemployed depends on Ministry of Labor (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social—
STPS), which has played a coordinating role among all the secretaries and agencies administering 
PETS  since  late  2008.  Preliminary evidence seems to  show  that only one  of the  implementing 
agencies, the Ministry of Social Development (La Secretaría de Desarrollo Social—SEDESOL) has been 
able  to  reach  the  unemployed  and  the  urban  areas.  Perhaps  because  of  its  experience  in  the 
expansion of other social programs in urban areas (such as Oportunidades and Estancias Infantiles), 
SEDESOL has shown a pattern of allocation of PET resources that is correlated with the level of 
unemployment and the size of the urban population. 
 
In addition, preliminary evidence from administrative data shows some association between PET 
budget  allocations  and  poverty,  unemployment,  and  urbanization.  However,  these  variables  are 
highly correlated so that conditional associations are needed to ascertain if PET is reaching the 36 
 
urban population and the unemployed. This is important because, despite being assigned new roles 
during the crisis, PET is still a program for protecting the poor from seasonal shocks. Econometric 
evidence shows that PET has indeed become more oriented towards the unemployed and the urban 
population.  However,  three  caveats  are  necessary.
8  First, poverty is still the major  criterion  for 
identification of beneficiaries in the program. Second, SEDESOL seems to be the  only dependent 
agency that has allocated resources to the unemployed. Third, it is mostly in year 2010 that PET in 
SEDESOL has reallocated  resources to the urban and the unemployed , which suggests that  there 
has been a learning curve in this process. 
 
All this evidence indicates that there is room for improvement in the allocation of resources towards 
areas most affected by unemployment. Additional data for monitoring and evaluating the program is 
necessary for a more accurate picture, but it is clear that PET is  mainly an antipoverty program that 
focuses  on  the  rural  poor .  Therefore,  PET  needs  consider  how  to  increase  coverage  and 
effectiveness among the unemployed population in urban areas. 
 
The SNE, as presented in table 4.2, includes several actions  that support  recruitment matching 
mechanisms for job seekers. These include a Web site listing positions posted by firms, telephone 
services for same purpose,  workshops for job seekers,  and labor festivals that bring together job 
seekers and firms. ANFEFE’s Support to Employment program provides scholarships for workers 
in the Fellowship Training Program for Work (Programa de Becas de Capacitación para el Trabajo—
PROBECAT or PAC) program, the Training Grants for Work (Becas de Capacitación para el Trabajo—
BECATE) program, and other small programs.  
 
BECATE offers training courses and a modest scholarship to unemployed and underemployed job 
seekers. It has about seven different modalities covering different types of population. Most of the 
modalities provide private training courses. However, it was estimated that BECATE only trains 0.5 
percent of their potential population.
9 Also, an incidence analysis indicates that the programs are 
benefiting the better-educated workers.  
 
PAC partially subsidizes  on-the-job training for workers employed in formal sector firms. The 
objective of the training is to increase the worker and the firm’s productivity. Impact evaluations 
have shown some positive effects on technology adoption, introduction of business reorganization 
in firms, and on productivity of the firm in some time periods. However, there are no evaluations 
showing an impact on worker wages. 
 
In general, the number of beneficiaries attending SNE programs increased as well those effectively 
hired. For example, in 2007 3.2 million people attended, of which 657,000 were hired, while in 2010 
4 million attended, of which 987,000 were hired. However, the ratio of the effectively hired to 
attended slightly decreased from 0.29 in 2007 to 0.24 in 2010. 
 
                                                           
8 This econometric analysis is included in “Temporary Employment Programs. International Evidence and Mexico’s 
Experience during the 2009-2010 Crisis,” a World Bank report available upon request. 
9 See UAM, 2008b. 37 
 
Table 4.2: National Employment System  
 
Recruitment Service  Support to Employment  Microregions  Emergency Actions  Total 
  Year  Attended  Hired  Attended  Hired  Attended  Hired  Attended  Hired  Attended  Hired 
2005  1,712,639  375,140  340,597  186,841  11,557  4,366  n.a.  n.a.  2,111,177  591,438 
2006  1,772,493  377,747  301,285  165,428  12,362  6,262  n.a.  n.a.  2,086,140  549,437 
2007  1,950,746  447,814  309,884  200,960  12,250  8,705  n.a.  n.a.  2,272,880  657,479 
2008  2,775,180  590,986  463,227  262,230  6,067  3,062  n.a.  n.a.  3,244,474  856,278 
2009  3,424,515  577,545  398,406  222,357  n.a.  n.a.  116,480  96,500  3,939,401  896,402 
2010  3,563,825  665,861  439,842  261,119  n.a.  n.a.  81,007  60,817  4,084,674  987,797 
Source: Ministry of Labor. 
Notes: Recruitment service: includes the recruitment agency in all forms, workshops for seeking jobs, and agriculture 
temporary jobs. Support to employment includes PROBECAT, PAE, BECATE, internal labor mobility. Emergency 
actions include: Action for Support Employment, Emergency Actions for Service Sector Workers. 
 
There are two passive labor market policies included in the ANFEFE: (i) expanded withdrawals 
from pension savings accounts for unemployed workers, and (ii) extended coverage of health and 
maternity  benefits  for  unemployed  workers  who  contributed  to  the  system.  The  latter  was  a 
temporary measure that protected workers and their families during the worst period of the crisis 
(the  first  and  second  quarters  of  2009).  The  former  is  a  permanent  change  with  long-term 
implications. The short-term distributive impact of these policies will likely be favorable to middle-
income families. In fact, both measures are linked to being a beneficiary of the formal social security 
systems in Mexico, particularly the IMSS. In this regard, beneficiaries of the IMSS are concentrated 
in the middle and top deciles of the income distribution; hence, expanded withdrawals from pension 
funds and extended coverage of health insurance are more likely to occur in middle and top deciles. 
If unemployment concentrates in lower-middle income households then this policy will likely have a 
distributive impact favorable to these households in the short term. Expanded withdrawals from 
individual  retirement  accounts  did  allow  the  government  to  respond  rapidly  to  increasing 
unemployment during global crisis. However, there might be a need for a broader review of passive 
labor market policies in the medium term since the current provision threatens to erode workers’ 
pension funds. 
 
The  expansion  of  the  unemployment  withdrawal  facility  had  a  rapid  response  by  potential 
beneficiaries.  The  number  of  withdrawals  in  2009  nearly  doubled  the  number  in  2008 and  the 
average amount withdrawn grew by 39 percent. In 2010 the number of withdrawals was still 60 
percent higher than in 2008, and the average amount is now 73 percent higher than in 2008. This is 
partly the consequence of the increase in the maximum withdrawal allowed (now up to 90 days of 
salary, instead of 75) and the  relaxed eligible for this facility (only three years of contributions, 
instead of five). These numbers also highlight the relevance and usefulness of the instrument in a 
period of growing, and still unabated, unemployment. 
 
There are concerns about the adequacy of this instrument as unemployment protection and its 
impact on the future pensions. In year 2009, the average withdrawal was of 5,355 pesos (equivalent 38 
 
to approximately 22 days at the average salary of workers who contribute to IMSS). In year 2010, the 
average withdrawal was of 6,673 pesos (equivalent to 28 days at the average IMSS salary). These 
could be equated to nearly two months of unemployment insurance with a 50 percent replacement 
rate  (still  below  the  three  months  with  50  percent  replacement  rate  seen  in  the  less  generous 
unemployment systems in OECD countries). Given that withdrawals can be extended up to six 
months, and the first one cannot exceed 30 days of the last salary, it seems that most withdrawals are 
making use of this first-month limit. 
 
It is not clear if beneficiaries of the provision are actually unemployed (there are neither supervision 
nor activation mechanisms associated with the use of the facility). Nevertheless, the number of 
withdrawals per month follows closely the evolution of the unemployment rate during 2009 (see 
figure 2.7). After reaching a peak of nearly 140,000 withdrawals in July 2009, the monthly average 
has declined to around 80,000 since March 2010, still well above the average 40,000 withdrawals 
observed in 2008 and 2007. This is compatible with the unabated open unemployment rate observed 
during most of 2010. 
 
Assuming individuals make only one withdrawal (the first), which would be an upper bound, the 
numbers  indicate  that  around  100,000  individuals  per  month  benefit  from  this  unemployment 
protection facility. However, the number of unemployed workers has been above 2 million since the 
first quarter of 2009. This indicates the paucity of the mechanism given the size of the problem. 
 
Moreover,  at  the  time  of  writing  this  report,  there  is  no  official  information  about  the 
reimbursements that workers have made to their individual accounts. This is a critical issue in the 
sustainability of the mechanism. On the one hand, incomplete reimbursements affect the pension 
that the worker may enjoy at retirement. On the other hand, without reimbursements, if the worker 
faces a new unemployment spell in the future (the limit is not before five years) she will again have 
to carve into her fund, further debilitating her pension at retirement. If unemployment spells last 
more  than  six  months  or  occur  again  before  the  five-year  limit,  the  worker  would  have  no 
unemployment protection mechanism. 
Another passive labor policy is Unemployment Insurance for the Elderly (Seguro de Cesantía en Edad 
Avanzada) for unemployed workers 60 years of age and older who worked in the formal private 
sector. Workers who contribute for at least 24 years to the social security system can receive a 
pension payment if they become unemployed. Those who do not reach the contribution time can 
withdraw in one lump sum the account balance for unemployment relief.
10 In addition, workers can 
receive a severance payment in case of a layoff. However, this applies only to workers employed in 
formal firms covered by the law.  Still another passive labor policy is an Unemployment Insurance 
introduced in 2006 in Mexico City by the local government, which is still a small program. The 
program is for workers in the formal sector, in firms based in Mexico City, and provides up to six 
months of relief equal to the minimum wage. 
                                                           
10 Ley del Seguro Social (Social Security Law), 1995.  39 
 
Our conclusion is that labor market policies in Mexico are still limited and underfunded. Even 
though the country has implemented a variety of active labor market programs, the funding and 
coverage of these programs are insufficient for dealing with either the current crisis or future ones. 
Total unemployment withdrawals from pension funds represented 0.14 percent of nominal GDP in 
2009. This contrasts with allocations of 0.5 to 2 percent of GDP in European Union (EU) and other 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries for passive labor 
market policies (see figure 4.1). The budgets of temporary employment programs, training, and 
intermediation services represent less than 0.3 percent of the Mexican GDP whereas these active 
labor market policies account for between 0.5 to 1 percentage point of the GDP in EU and OECD 
countries. In order to have better mechanisms for dealing with the aftermath of the current crisis 
and, more important, with future crisis, Mexico needs to enhance its labor market policies both in 
terms of funding and design. As mentioned before regarding the expansion of PET, Mexico seems 
ready to consider a technical analysis for an enhanced unemployment protection mechanism, as well 
as further expansions of its labor policies. 
 
Figure 4.1: Unemployment Withdrawals from Pension Accounts and Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: INEGI, BIE, SEDESOL, and data provided by the National Commission for the Pension System (Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro 
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The 2008-2009 economic crisis still shows long-lasting negative effects in the Mexican economy. 
The  dramatic  slowdown  in  economic  growth  in  early  2009  was  felt  worldwide.  Within  Latin 
America, Mexico was heavily affected, with GDP growth falling by 7 percentage points, partly as a 
result of its close trade links to the United States. The unemployment rate increased sharply from 3.5 
percent to about 5.5 percent at the peak of the crisis. The levels of informality are still high at 
around 66 percent of the economic active population. Average real wages declined and had not 
recovered. The economic crisis led to a rapid decline and recovery in total employment in 2010. 
However, the economy has not been able to produce enough jobs to recover to unemployment rates 
at pre-crisis levels. The unemployment rate, which was 6.41 percent at the peak of the crisis in 
September 2009, declined to a 4.81 percent in March 2010 but then increased again to above 5 
percent for most of 2010.  
During the crisis, some sectors reduced employment, others adjusted real wages only, and others 
adjusted both. The crisis severely affected economic activities associated with tradable products (that 
is, agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism). Construction, even though is not a sector of tradable 
goods, also endured a severe contraction. During the recovery, all sectors (with the exception of 
mining) showed job creation with lower real wages. In 2009 average wages fell in all sectors but two: 
manufacturing and government services. Manufacturing was also the sector that endured the largest 
job losses. This indicates a clear pattern of adjustment to the crisis through employment rather than 
wages in this sector. The fact that government services were unaffected by the crisis is perhaps 
related to the fact that there was not fiscal consolidation associated with the crisis. The fall in wages 
in sectors ranged from a slight -0.1 percent in social services and -1.2 percent in the financial sector 
to a severe -9.7 percent in restaurants and hotels and -5.1 percent in trade in commerce. The services 
sector experienced job creation in every quarter: even at the peak of the crisis this sector was 
creating about 722,000 jobs.  
The workers more likely to stay in a job during the economic crisis were male, highly skilled, 
household heads, and middle aged. Women were proportionately more affected by the crisis and 
more favored during the expansion. Finding a job became more difficult for low-skilled labor, and in 
contrast skilled labor did not seem to be affected. The crisis had a severe impact on firms associated 
with tradable goods, exports, and manufacturing in particular. These firms concentrate at the U.S.-
Mexican border and have not picked up again despite the ending of the recession in both countries. 
The south Pacific and the peninsula regions are the only ones that did not suffer job losses either in 
2009 or in 2010. Small and medium firms were responsible for the largest share of job creation 
during the recovery. In contrast, medium and large firms accounted for the larger portion of the 
reduction. This is compatible with the former description of a recession mostly affecting 
manufacturing firms and the recovery mostly favoring commerce and other services. It also depicts a 
crisis that destroyed employment in certain sectors of the economy and, four quarters later, these 
sectors have not return to their previous levels. If we assume that because of competitive pressures 41 
 
and larger capital endowment, tradable sectors and large firms are the ones with higher productivity 
and wages, we can then say that the recovery has not still boosted the labor market back to pre-crisis 
levels, leaving the Mexican workers in a weaker position than before the crisis. 
Labor market dynamics are changing. The crisis produced a significant dislocation of the Mexican 
labor market. There were large amounts of employment destruction and creation that left the 
country with employment similar to pre-crisis levels, but unemployment around 900,000 people 
more than before the crisis. Average wages declined for all sectors. In addition, there is accelerated 
growth in the working age population that likely is a result of changing migration patterns. Two 
forces may have played a role in this. First, the recession in the United States may have forestalled 
migration from Mexico to the United States. Second, for the same reason, Mexican migrants in the 
United States may have returned to their country of origin. However, preliminary evidence suggests 
that even though the crisis more strongly affected Hispanics in the United States, there was no net 
change in migration. Workers in the United States did not return home in greater numbers, and 
workers from Mexico did not migrate to the United States in greater numbers. 
To cope with the crises, the Mexican government announced a series of recovery programs that 
were mainly financed with oil revenues. Even though public expenditure increased during the crisis, 
private investment was lagging. Private sector growth seemingly has not responded to increased 
public investment and indeed lags below pre-crisis levels. There is limited information about public 
works programs, and the available data indicate that very modest progress was attained during the 
first year of the crisis, when it was most needed. The data also indicate that employment in the 
construction sector contracted dramatically, even though government programs should have had an 
immediate impact on this sector.  
Labor market policies in Mexico are still limited and underfunded. Even though the country has 
implemented most a variety of active labor market programs, the funding and coverage of these 
programs are insufficient for dealing with either the current crisis or future ones. Total 
unemployment withdrawals from pension funds represent 0.14 percent of nominal GDP in 2009. 
This contrasts with allocations of 0.5 to 2 percent of GDP in EU and other OECD countries for 
passive labor market policies (see figure 5.1). The budgets of temporary employment programs, 
training, and intermediation services represent less than 0.3 percent of the Mexican GDP whereas 
these active labor market policies account for 0.5 to 1 percentage points of the GDP in EU and 
OECD countries. In order to have better mechanisms for dealing with the aftermath of the current 
crisis and, more important, with future crisis, Mexico needs to enhance its labor market policies both 
in terms of funding and design. In fact, Mexico seems ready to consider further expansions in its 
labor policies. 42 
 
Figure 5.1: Labor Market Policies as Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD (2009).  
a) Unweighted average for OECD EU countries. Data exclude the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Slovak Republic. 
b) The active totals are calculated for Denmark and the United Kingdom excluding from Category 1 in the years 2000 the data for benefit 
administration, which are affected by significant statistical breaks. 
c) Unweighted average for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States.  
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